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in Postmodern Perspective
by Branden T. C. Miller
The author draws parallels between psychology and religious modernism as exempli-
fied in the writings ofsuch figures as Harry Emerson Fosdick. Miller suggests that psycho-
logical research arguing that fundamentalists are "cognitivcly challenged" is more reflec-
tive ofpsychology's unacknowledged modernist assumptions than descriptive offundamental-
ists. A post-modernist recognition ofpsychology's bias should help redirect efforts toward
understanding fundamentalists' pressing desire to preserve a particular orderly culture.
"Organized knowledge has come into
open conflict with organized ignorance,"
Maynard Shipley declared at one peak of the
controversy between Christian modernists
and fundamentalists earlier this century. 1
Surely not too many periods in any nation
have been completely void of religious
change or unrest, but the past century on the
religious frontier in America, filled with
apocalyptic visions on all sides, has achieved
some particularly interesting and dramatic
extremes. The great force of "ignorance*' to
which Shipley referred was America's own
homegrown brand of Christian fundamen-
talism, a small but vocal movement that has
been at the center of (or pushing stridently
along the edges through) much of the change
and controversy this century. The opposing
principles of modernism, whose early con-
fidence in new fields of human knowledge
ultimately became a part of the dominant
cultural point of view, seem to have pre-
vailed for some time. According to some
more recent prophets of the postmodern era,
however, confidence in those principles has
now been largely discredited. Condemna-
tion of fundamentalists and their methodolo-
gies has, nonetheless, remained substantially
the same, even among the critically astute.
Harold Bloom, for example—always as id-
iosyncratic as he is insightful
—
plays on the
literal meaning of an old term, dubbing them
the nation's new "Know-Nothings." 2
A significant portion of the polemic
against fundamentalism sustained after
Shipley's day has come from perspectives
making reference to psychology—a quintes-
sentially modernist undertaking. By the
1960s, at least five major studies showed a
negative correlation between religiosity and
intelligence and/or education. 3 Despite much
subsequent research and a fair amount of evi-
dence now available to the contrary, some
contemporary investigators have still felt
compelled to ask whether "intelligent funda-
mentalist" might not be an oxymoron. 4 The
question is whether these assessments are just
another round of "canon fire" between two
warring cultures of belief, or whether, once
they are controlled for some hidden preju-
dices, they actually are indicative of some
genuine characteristics distinguishing funda-
mentalists as a whole from other groups.
The feature of biblical literalism has
been central to a great deal of the psycho-
logical research on fundamentalism because
of its presumed association with less cogni-
tive complexity—that is to say, with a ten-
dency toward concrete rather than abstract
thinking. It will be proposed, however, that
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a better explanation for the principle of bib-
lical literalism in fundamentalist circles may
be that it is part of a socially shared cognitive
style or culture of interpretation. Such a view
might not only help explain fundamentalists'
frequent, unacknowledged, departures from
literal interpretation, it might also suggest a
connection to other related features, such as
their selective attention and dogmatism.
From this point of view, the attraction of this
movement has much less to do with intelli-
gence than with personal inclinations such as
a preference for order, an intolerance of am-
biguity, or an underlying wish to preserve a
certain ideological vision and way of life.
What is at riskfor the fundamentalists
in interpreting the Bible is not its
authenticity, but the credibility of a
carefully constructed absolutist dogma
that is never to be challenged—not
even by the Bible.
Before an evenhanded evaluation of
fundamentalist beliefs can be produced from
the psychological point of view, it is impera-
tive (though seemingly unpracticed) to ac-
knowledge the historical context of this ideo-
logically loaded debate. Psychology is cer-
tainly an heir to modernist views of funda-
mentalism—a legacy of assumptions that
continues to play a role in its evaluations and
self-understanding. Despite this significant
proviso, a brief survey of some relevant lit-
erature shows that, as a systematic approach,
psychology may yet have a great deal to of-
fer in the quest to understand fundamental-
ism. The observed differences in cognitive
complexity probably result not from the fun-
damentalists' being "cognitively chal-
lenged," as many have suggested, but rather
from their being culturally trained and in-
clined to different habits of cognition—most
likely within the single domain of religion.
The further suggestion is made that through
a process of recognizing some of its own
value judgments, psychology itself may have
begun to acknowledge the limits of modern-
ism, and may even be seen as tempering
some of its previous conclusions in response
to postmodern perspectives.
Modernism and the origins of
fundamentalism
During the last half of the nineteenth
century, under general pressure from the
waxing influence of scientific methodology
and from the Darwinian revolution in par-
ticular, Christianity slowly fissured into two
camps: the modernists, who
sought to incorporate new
means of exploration and new
knowledge into theology, and
the fundamentalists, who re-
sisted such change. Funda-
mentalism thus arose as a de-
fense, out of a genuine con-
cern to preserve the integrity
I
of a faith and its tradition of
values that seemed to be
threatened by the increasing
popularity of scientific approaches and val-
ues. By the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, this movement clearly started
losing ground to ascendant modernist val-
ues. It was unable to claim its place as a
completely logical, empirically based ap-
proach, and began crystallizing around five
dogmatically held "fundamentals" of faith:
1. The inerrancy of the Bible
2. The virgin birth
3. Christ's substitutionary atonement
4. Christ's physical resurrection
5. Christ's anticipated return to
earth to reign over a thousand
years of peace before Judgment.
Of these doctrines, only the second, third, and
fourth are ancient Christian beliefs."' Together,
these fundamentals defined the movement that
came to be known as ''fundamentalism."
Number five, the "premillennialist" assump-
tion, certainly lends a heightened sense of ur-
gency, but it is perhaps the doctrine of the in-
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errancy of the Bible that has been the flash
point for the greatest controversy.
"Biblical inerrancy" and the errors
of interpretation
"All Scripture is given by inspiration of
God, and is profitable for doctrine, for re-
proof, for correction, for instruction in righ-
teousness." f> Often citing this son of pas-
sage, fundamentalists revere the Bible as the
sole and sufficient rule, which, therefore, has
to be objectively true and plainly accessible
to all. Following the developmental models
of Piaget, 7 psychology has been inclined to
equate this insistence on literal interpreta-
tion of the Bible with having become stuck
at the "concrete" level of understanding, and
possibly not having fully developed the ca-
pacity for abstract thinking/ In all fairness
to psychology, some fundamentalist state-
ments do, at least at first blush, lend them-
selves to this sort of interpretation. What is
to be made, for example, of the apparent
blindness to hermeneutic complexities illus-
trated by President Grover Cleveland's ex-
pression of frustration with biblical scholar-
ship: "I do not want notes or criticism or
explanations about authorship or origins or
even cross-references. / do not need them
or understand them, and they confuse me'"! 9
And yet. if the admission is made from the
beginning that reading the Bible is hard
—
hard for anyone—and that anyone's reading
of a text is invariably reductive and person-
ally biased in some ways, then what might
ultimately be found is that there is much
more behind Literalism (and its shibboleth
of "biblical inerrancy") than mere cognitive
simplicity. At the same time, some grounds
for critique of the fundamentalist approach
are preserved. As Peter Gomes notes, the
idea that "the Bible says what it means and
means what it says. ..is as dangerous and
wrong as it is simple and memorable." "'
Indeed, no one, not even a fundamentalist,
really reads the parables of Jesus or the Song
of Solomon the same way that he or she
would read the Ten Commandments.
It is not, however, just biblical literal-
ism, but also selective attention and dogma-
tism, that appear to possess a more exagger-
ated presence in fundamentalist practice and
belief. In his recent volume. The Good Book,
Gomes makes a particularly helpful contri-
bution in his assertion that there are actually
three deadly temptations in the process of
biblical interpretation. First comes "literal-
ism," the worship of the text, in which the
letter is given an inappropriate superiority
over the spirit. Next is "culturism." the wor-
ship of culture, in which the Bible is forced
to conform to the norms of the prevailing
culture. And thirdly, the worship of the Bible,
whereby it is granted the place and authority
of God. Gomes identifies as "bibliolatry." "
Other investigators would probably
agree that all three of these errors are to be
found peppered in among the modern mani-
festations of fundamentalism in various com-
binations and concentrations. More specifi-
cally, however, the investigation pursued
here argues that culturism, rather than the
popularly brandished literalism, is the pri-
mary culprit and defining impulse of funda-
mentalism. Rather than literalism resulting
from cognitive characteristics, the inconsis-
tency of its application as an interpretive
principle suggests that when it actually does
appear, it does so largely in service of cul-
tural forces and personal needs. Such a con-
clusion might be of little suiprise to anyone
viewing the problem from a purview out-
side psychology's modern cultural domi-
nance. Today, however, having given over
so many modes of thought to psychological
ways of thinking, scholars and others may
have absorbed some of its disciplinary bias
(as the study of the mind) and become preju-
dicially quick to embrace cognitive expla-
nations, seeing them as primary, indepen-
dent, or underlying all others.
This is not, on the other hand, to say
that psychology is in any way a bootless or
redundant enterprise, or that its instincts in
this regard are entirely wrong. Rather it is
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to suggest that there may be alternative psy-
chological viewpoints, superior to those usu-
ally applied, that better explain why
fundamentalism's particular culturist tenden-
cies are appealing to some people, and how,
exactly, individuals accomplish such
Procrustean readings of the Bible in service
of their social assumptions and dogmas.
Indeed, everyone might have a great deal to
learn from the observation of this dynamic:
it entails the same processes of selective
reading and misreading that allowed good
Christian Americans to be slave owners un-
til the Civil War, and to participate in segre-
gation up until the time of Martin Luther
King, Jr. i:
The first observation to be made regard-
ing this process is that when faced with the
difficult task of having to read the Bible, the
fundamentalists' need to avoid actually read-
ing the Bible as a whole may come as an
appealing relief to many. This has probably
also contributed heavily to an increase in the
numbers of those falling prey to Gomes'
third interpretive temptation, bibliolatry. Just
so, Ellen Rosenberg has remarked, "As the
code words have be-
come 'Biblical iner-
rancy,' the Bible itself is
less read than preached,
less interpreted than
brandished." 13 Even
more than a "protean
Rorschach," as she sug-
gests, when it comes to
the Bible, the real
meaning of "inerrant"
today is "unread." 14 In-
deed, "textual" preaching is frequently wor-
thy of being lampooned these days because,
as Gomes observes, the Bible is often merely
used as "...some sort of spiritual or textual
trampoline: You go into it in order to bounce
off of it as far as possible, and your only pur-
pose in returning to it was to get away from
it again." l5
Only the hierarchy of interdependent
interpretive errors presented here, placing
culturism at its head, also explains the in-
consistencies that have exasperated so
many critics and allowed psychologists to
blur fundamentalism's predilections with
intellectual misfortune. The reason Ortho-
dox rabbis insist that King David was holy
and did not sin, despite what the Bible
says, 16 is that fundamentalism of all kinds
demands not literal interpretation by lim-
ited minds, but rather a subscription to the
absoluteness of a single preordained doc-
trinal point of view. What is at risk for the
fundamentalists in interpreting the Bible is
not its authenticity, but the credibility of a
carefully constructed absolutist dogma that
is never to be challenged—not even by the
Bible. Intransigence is the true goal, and
literalism is sometimes the means, some-
times an obstacle, and often merely a skirt
to hide behind in a modernist-style culture
that demands some kind of systematic ap-
proach. These important points issuing
from a historically and anthropologically
informed point of view will be revisited
after an exploration of modernism and a
survey of some of the psychological mate-
Christian modernism.. .tended to assume
that knowledge was inherently good, that
progress was inevitable, that any question
was answerable, and that religion and
science were ultimately compatible if they
were explored with rigorous, systematic
thought.
rial regarding fundamentalism in light of
that perspective.
Modernism and the cultural
grounding of knowledge
Growing out of the Enlightenment,
modernism has sometimes been defined
through its association with four emergent
cultural trends: a new respect for rational
thinking, a strong faith in the utility of sci-
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ence and philosophy to ascertain the Truth,
an inchoate understanding of global plural-
ism, and the rise of a secular world-view.
Christian modernism, as popularly exempli-
fied by Harry Emerson Fosdick's 1922 ser-
mon, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" n
tended to assume that knowledge was inher-
ently good, that progress was inevitable, that
any question was answerable, and that reli-
gion and science were ultimately compat-
ible if they were explored with rigorous, sys-
tematic thought.
Despite their obvious differences, in
earlier parts of this century, fundamentalism
and modernism had a number of character-
istics in common: both took faith seriously
and provided an alternative to secularism;
both saw themselves as making a much
needed response to the spirit of the age and
tried to preserve the Bible as pail of modern
life; and most importantly for the purposes
of this study, modernism as typified by
Fosdick. and fundamentalism as originally
inaugurated by Charles Hodge, were both
optimistic enterprises. That is to say, while
their methods and conclusions differed
Compared to the fundamentalists tested,
the non-fundamentalists were shown to
be more complex, open, and critical pro-
cessors—fail only of the information
related to existential!religious issues.
sharply from each other, they both believed
that everything in the Bible and in the world
had a pattern, and that systematic efforts can
always lead to improved answers to ques-
tions and. in time, to the arrival at the Truth.
"There is
—
quite ironically," as medical an-
thropologist Byron Good has said, "a close
relationship between science and religious
fundamentalism": both hold to the neces-
sity and diligent pursuit of "correct" be-
liefs. 18 To put it another way, the hallmark
of the modern secular approach, according
to Clifford Geertz. is "a salvational belief in
the powers of science." l9 The fact that this
could not be a more apt characterization of
psychology's deepest self-understanding
—
an understanding that has come into ques-
tion in the postmodern era—should lend cru-
cial perspective to any assessment of psy-
chological literature concerning fundamen-
talism.
While it is easy to recognize the inter-
pretive errors, inconsistencies, and biases of
other systems of understanding, such as fun-
damentalism, "...it is difficult to avoid a
strong conviction that our own system of
knowledge [actually] reflects the natural
order.. .that our own. ..categories are natural
and 'descriptive' rather than essentially cul-
tural and 'classificatory.'" 20 This is what
Good has called anthropology's greatest con-
tribution to twentieth-century sociology of
knowledge: its insistence that all our "...hu-
man knowledge is culturally shaped and con-
stituted in relation to distinctive forms of life
and social organization." 21 These are the
perceptions that have led to thepostmodern
perspectivism—a recogni-
tion of the much more
sweeping manner in which
"truth" and understanding
are shaped by one's point of
view. In this epistemologi-
cal milieu, psychology
seems to be beginning to rec-
ognize some of the value
judgments inherent to its en-
terprise—to recognize, that is to say, its own
modernist tendencies.
Cognitive psychological views of
fundamentalism: from "cognitively
challenged ,, to culturally-shared
cognitive style
Psychological studies have explored
many dimensions of fundamentalism and
associated it with everything from far more
positive attitudes towards corporal punish
ment22 to a higher incidence of colon can-
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cer.
23 More to the point, however, in addi-
tion to Goldman's work in the tradition of
Piaget and the five other studies discussed
by Meadow and Kahoe,24 mentioned above,
there are other studies from the past few de-
cades that continue to lend support to the
thesis that fundamentalists are, on average,
of lower intellectual functioning. In two
studies of Who's Who, published in 1969 and
1971, for example, James Dittes observed
that high status in our society has for some
time been correlated with religious skepti-
cism and nonaffiliation.25
Beyond Zaehry's hesitant conclusion 2 '1
that an "intelligent fundamentalist" just
might be a contradiction in terms, Edgington
and Hutchinson27 showed a significant cor-
relation between fundamentalism and gen-
eral lack of cognitive complexity through a
paragraph completion test that specifically
measured how an individual classifies and
integrates information. Hunsberger and his
coworkers 2 * discovered that while non-fun-
damentalists reported coming to significant
doubts about their religion by "just thinking
about it," only the significant jolt of trau-
matic life events seemed to do the same for
fundamentalists. Striking a similar chord,
Malony 2" claims to have found significant
differences in cognitive functioning (lower
degree of cognitive flexibility, less sensitiv-
ity to the multiplicity of objects' meanings,
etc.) through a scale measuring the degree
to which an individual made literal, "anti-
literal," and mythological interpretations of
doctrinal statements.
As cumulatively persuasive as these
studies may seem, there are a number of
studies that do not share their conclusions.
Indeed, some of the earlier developmentally-
based models that equated fundamentalism
with arrested cognitive development 3" have
been discredited by findings that many
people's religious thinking actual regresses
toward literalism again after they reach ma-
turity, 31 rather than progressing from literal-
ism toward abstraction. Furthermore, less
disparaging interpretations seem to be avail-
able for most of the recent research. While
the issue does remain unresolved, until the
last few years most psychological investiga-
tors seem to have overlooked the possibility
that, rather than demonstrating the sort of
general cognitive differences that their dis-
cipline is inclined to pursue, research results
may actually be reflecting differences in cog-
nition specific only to the domain of religion.
The critical question, then, that must be
asked is this: "Is there any basis for inter-
preting findings as indicative of overall abil-
ity, rather than simply an elected preference
in specific areas of functioning? With the
possible exception of Edgington and
Hutchinson's 1990 study, the answer to this
question seems to be "no." Hunsberger et
al.
32
cite two studies showing that, in regard
to religious/existential issues (such as the ex-
istence of God and life after death), strong
fundamentalists were much less cognitively
complex in their thinking. In regard to non-
religious issues, however, there seemed to
be no difference in complexity of thought
between fundamentalists and non-funda-
mentalists on nonreligious issues. Their sub-
sequent study 33 produced similar results by
presenting subjects with two ethical, two en-
vironmental, and two religious dilemmas.
The responses they received were then ana-
lyzed for integrative complexity of thought.
Compared to the fundamentalists tested, the
non-fundamentalists were shown to be more
complex, open, and critical processors—but
only of the information related to existen-
tial/religious issues.
If this is in fact the case, reference-frame
theory may partially explain this phenom-
enon: when asked to view a situation from
a religious perspective, an individual could
be expected to use a cognitive scheme re-
lated to his or her manner of processing bib-
lical information. Another implication here
is that methods of religious pedagogy should
contribute to the shaping of cognitive pro-
cessing styles. One study comparing Bap-
tists and Roman Catholics34 has substanti-
ated exactly this point. In the Baptist tradi-
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tion, in which individuals are encouraged to
"witness" and "testify," it was found that in-
dividuals were much more likely to think
about themselves and make interpretations
with reference to concrete personal episodes
that psychology would invariably assess as
pan of lower-level thinking. ,s
As McCallister36 has recently suggested,
these data help to illustrate persuasively that
certain denominations do cultivate goal-re-
lated preferences for particular cognitive
styles. In this same manner, fundamental-
ists may train each other to exhibit the lit-
eral and concrete-level thinking that has been
observed, as a socially shared processing
style. The question that now remains to be
addressed is why this thought-shaping phe-
nomenon should exist. Other lines of re-
search may help explain why and how this
cognitive style or preferential mode of func-
tioning develops and maintains itself in in-
dividuals and in groups.
Fundamentalists: "cognitive misers" in
a different way or to a different degree?
Psychology has catalogued many heu-
ristics, schemas, and biases that human be-
ings cultivate as efficient cognitive shortcuts
to guide behavior while reducing mental
load and reaction time.' 7 Without them, the
barrage of sensory data and logical and emo-
tional contingencies would be completely
immobilizing. In this sense, human beings
are all, therefore, "cognitive misers"—ca-
pable only of thinking actively about a cer-
tain subset of the facts, issues, realities, and
possibilities that shape their lives, some of
which are chosen and some of which are not.
Considered from a sheerly pragmatic
psychological point of view, religion is the
most elementary story that humans tell about
themselves, giving definition to the world
and identifying the human purpose and
proper place within it; and it surely func-
tions as one of the most important reposito-
ries of perspectives and rules for use as men-
tal shortcuts to guide behavior and shape un-
derstanding. While many psychologists
would concede that religion in general sup-
plies meaning to life and offers a degree of
relief from some potentially overwhelming
anxieties, they, along with observers from
many other perspectives, are quick to sug-
gest that there seems to be something differ-
ent, something unusually extreme, going on
under the wings of fundamentalism.
Exploring the ideology of political ex-
tremism. Liset and Rabb3x may make a help-
ful contribution to the understanding of the
fundamentalist anthem of biblical inerrancy
and literalism when they target the occur-
rence of "simplism"—the "unambiguous as-
cription of single causes and remedies for
multifactored phenomena." Simple answers
to complex problems have always been
popular, but it is significant that, according
to their study, 62% of right-wing letter writ-
ers, versus 28% of the national population,
hold that "the answers to our country's prob-
lems are much simpler than the experts
would have us believe." 3 ' Seeming to par-
allel fundamentalism in several important
ways, the mentality of simplism shuns obvi-
ous complexity and affirms that the experts
—
those who have specialized knowledge—are
wrong, and those who do not, are right.
In their tendency towards simplism in
biblical interpretation and other practices,
fundamentalists are certainly cognitive mi-
sers of another degree, if not an entirely dif-
ferent ilk. But this issue returns to one of
the principal concerns here, namely, to a fur-
ther consideration of the dichotomy drawn
between cognitive capability and culturally
shared and selected processing styles.
The modernist/fundamentalist
debate: a century-long clash of two
cultures differing in cognitive style
As one psychologist recently proposed
in a virtual reissue of the modernist mani-
festo, whereas most people tend to partition
their beliefs so that religion conflicts less
with the forces of reason they use to
guidetheir behavior, fundamentalists often
simply do not. 40 In 1922, Harry Emerson
Fosdick underscored a similar point when
he affirmed his belief that scripture. God.
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and the world might ultimately be under-
stood, but only through a reconciliation of
religious faith with the evolving knowledge
of human beings and the universe—a recon-
ciliation necessary to keep Christianity co-
herent and relevant to many thoughtful Chris-
tians. As he said, "There are multitudes of
reverent Christians who have been unable to
keep... new knowledge in one compartment
of their minds and the Christian faith in an-
other." Most people of Fosdick's day tended
"...to see...new knowledge in terms of the
Christian faith and to see the Christian faith
in terms of this new knowledge." 41 In con-
trast to the fundamentalists, who do not feel
compelled to effect this sort of reconcilia-
tion, the majority of people have subscribed
to modernist beliefs and see reaching such
resolutions to be a basic part of understand-
ing and, hence, of behaving properly in this
world. To put it another way. a broader ap-
plication of self-critical, systematic method-
ologies is seen as the best means of negotiat-
ing the path between human goals and hu-
man limitations as agents acting in the world.
Given the modernist assumptions of
most people today, the fundamentalists' par-
ticular choice of cognitive parsimony can be
very difficult to separate from a general con-
ception of ignorance. Dealing with funda-
mentalism can be frustrating, and it is easy
to confuse a choice not to think with an in-
ability to think—because the results are es-
sentially the same. One segment of the dia-
logue between Clarence Darrow and Will-
iam Jennings Bryan at the Scopes Trial in
1925 illustrates this point very nicely; it not
only elicited a confession from Bryan that
he had never chosen to explore the claims
of other religions, it also produced the fol-
lowing exchange:
Darrow: When was the flood?
Bryan: I would not attempt to fix the
date. The date is fixed as suggested
this morning [i.e., according to
Bishop Usher's chronology,
included in many Bibles].
Darrow: But what do you think that
the Bible itself says? Don't you
know how it was arrived at?
Bryan: I never made the calculation.
Darrow: A calculation from what?
Bryan: I could not say.
Darrow: From the generations of
man?
Bryan: I would not want to say that.
Darrow: What do you think?
Bryan: / do not think about things I
don't think about.
Darrow: Do you think about things
you do think about?
Bryan: Well, sometimes.42
While Bryan was surely a man of intel-
ligence and complexity, he showed neither
trait when it came to his religious world-
view. Darrow, consequently, made a fool of
him, just as psychology has at times made a
mockery of fundamentalism. As discussed
above, however, dogmatism and constricted
ranges of questioning are not unique to fun-
damentalism; they can result from any
discipline's unquestioned assumptions and
conceptual blind spots. Just so, one could
use Thomas Kuhn's analysis of paradigm
clashes in science to show that studies sug-
gesting fundamentalism to be the result of
cognitive impairment or even psychopathol-
ogy are completely misinterpreted.
Ralph Hood makes just such an argu-
ment, warning that psychologists should be
more wary of the influence of epistemic sys-
tems and power dynamics on the collection
and interpretation of data. 43 The history of the
psychological analysis of fundamentalism
does indeed indicate that psychologists should
heed this warning. At least as early as 1968,
psychologist Paul Pruyser44 observed that
some people who are perfectly capable of
thinking abstractly simply choose not to do
so, under the auspices of some religions. It
would seem, however, that psychology's sci-
entific/modernist bias against fundamental-
ism and towards cognitive assessments have
hindered its pursuit of this interpretation.
Perhaps a similar process of selective
attention can be observed in the discipline's
response to another extensive study carried
out by Gary Maranell.45 He explored the re-
ligious attitudes of five different groups: stu-
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dents, college professors, clergy, citizens of
a small Southern town, and members of a
Midwestern community. There were signifi-
cant educational and intellectual differences
between fundamentalists and non-funda-
mentalists only in the Southern town sample.
The fact that these differences were not
found in any of the other four samples seems
to have had little effect on the attitude of most
subsequent psychological researchers. It
seems reasonable to suggest that the South-
ern town sample supported the conclusions
that most researchers were looking for, and
the other data has simply been rationalized
away or selectively ignored.
In an effort to avoid relativism, a signifi-
cant difference should be noted here: whereas
science does its best to recognize and correct
these sorts of inconsistencies—and psychol-
ogy has come a long way to recognize some
of its disciplinary prejudices— fundamental-
ism simply attempts to defend and preserve
them at all costs. Prosecuting what it claims
to be a single, preordained, immutable point
of view, and doing so according to a method-
ology at odds with almost all others applied
at that same level to life in the modern West,
fundamentalism frequently becomes a source
of great consternation to those who encoun-
ter it. Harold Bloom surely articulates an
embittered but prevalent exasperation when
he says, "You can argue against dogmatism,
...but how can you argue against ignorance
stubbornly proud of itself?" 46
Maintaining the unmaintainable:
subordination of logical consistency
to cultural vision
Studies have shown that many fundamen-
talists might very well be cognitive misers in
a distinctively different way; 47 but not even
this finding in conjunction with the effects of
paradigm-related blind spots is sufficient to
explain the fundamentalist phenomenon in its
entirety. A return to the above-outlined dis-
cussion of the dogmatic "culturism" is war-
ranted. Fundamentalism might be seen as a
willful, knowing neglect—a conservation in
the use of reason for a reason.
Many psychological studies and theories
of fundamentalism have associated it with
"authoritarianism," that is to say, a very low
tolerance for ambiguity and need for definite
structure. 4* The fundamentalist phenomenon
has also been described in terms of "self-
schemas," patterns of understanding that
emerge in areas that individuals care about,
use to identify themselves, and inevitably
become attached to. Religious self-schemas
might logically result in protective cognitive
narrowing on religious topics in order to pre-
serve one's preferred identity. 4 ' Both of these
explanations have merit and are probably
major components in the appeal and preser-
vation of fundamentalist beliefs. But a third,
complementary psychological explanation
that is extremely consistent with funda-
mentalism's historical origins may be even
more encompassing: fundamentalism can be
seen as a primarily culturist enterprise—an
illusory attempt to resist change by clinging
to a moral, social, and cosmological system
that is not open to question. 50
Although fundamentalists are surely sin-
cere Christians, the fact that they claim to be
biblical literalists while often ignoring the
texts' literal sense, is convincing evidence
that they have a cultural viewpoint to which
they want to adhere, no matter what the Bible
or any other source of knowledge has to say.
Gomes' notion of culturism is.thus, clearly
demonstrated by the chasm of "biblical pro-
portions" that exists between their stated
methods and their formulaic conclusions.
The characteristic aggressiveness of fun-
damentalists' evangelism, and the sometimes
shrill desperation with which their agenda can
be executed might even be said to have a "she-
doth-protest-too-much" edge that is equally
damning. Any number of observers have
wondered if their frequently extreme tactics
are not actually a defensive overcompensa-
tion for underlying uncertainties that they
wish to dispel. Past studies have indeed
shown that some of the most outspoken and
defensive individuals are frequently the least
certain of their views. 51 Similarly, although
its findings are not absolutely unambiguous
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one recent investigation found that in response
to the question, "Do highly religious people
secretly have doubts about their religion?"
seventy-three percent of the most strongly fun-
damentalist respondents said "yes." 5:
What more can be said about how fun-
damentalists' beliefs are maintained in the
face of adversity? As Gomes remarks, one
certainly cannot preserve the
conclusion that the Bible has
a "clear and plain meaning"
by reading it.53 A recently
published study by Hertwig,
Gigerenzer, and Hoffrage54
entitled "Reiteration Effect
in Hindsight Bias" may,
however, give the first coher-
ent psychological explana-
tion for how one might come
to that conclusion simply by
wanting to believe it and
then repeating it or hearing it over and over
again. Exposing the deeper mechanics of
this phenomenon, these researchers have
constructed a compelling model of how rep-
etition of any assertion gradually increases
the degree of belief in that assertion.
Another piece of the puzzle comes from
cognitive dissonance theory. According to
findings, once an individual commits to a
particular position, he or she selectively at-
tends to supportive pieces of information
while ignoring contradictory ones. 5 ' Fun-
damentalists conform to this model since,
relative to other groups, they have a much
higher desire to ignore literature critical of
their position. Together with observations
regarding reiteration effects, this research
seems to provide a persuasive explanation
of how fundamentalists use self-isolation
from other points of view and the repetition
of carefully selected biblical verses to main-
tain their beliefs and shared cognitive styles.
Conclusion: final judgments in the
postmodern milieu
At this point, it is important to re-em-
phasize that this method of willful, distort-
ing self-exposure (as some psychologists
might see it) is no more characteristic of
Christianity in general than it is of every
other way of life. Some rather unsympa-
thetic branches of psychology have ques-
tioned whether many normative Christian
beliefs would survive without some constric-
tion of the range of questions allowed. Par-
ticularly in the wake of modernism's well-
The shift. . .in psychology's perspective
from seeingfundamentalism as a cog-
nitively challenged movement to one
simply subscribing to a particular
cultural style of mental processing (and
perhaps only of expression) is a signifi-
cant step in this postmodern direction.
touted decline, however, there is little ground
for asserting that conservative theology, in
and of itself, is a sign of inconsistency or
lack of cognitive complexity. Furthermore,
one should note that, when evaluating fun-
damentalists, psychology might have over-
reached its own bounds in yet another way.
In a lecture, Peter Gomes' 6 cited the words
attributed to Anna Barlett Warner
—
"Jesus
loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me
so"—as an example of the proto-fundamen-
talists' redefinition ofterms to meet the mod-
ernist challenge. Subsequently, affirmations
such as these have continued to be dispar-
aged by psychology as evidence of non-op-
timal or underdeveloped thinking. However,
Karl Barth, one of the most learned and pro-
lific theologians of this century, when asked
late in life what was the most important thing
he knew about the Christian faith, responded
with these very same, simple words: "Jesus
loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me
so." " One such concrete answer—which
obviously signifies a great deal more to such
a sophisticated religious thinker—is enough
to call into question some of the most per-
suasive psychological studies. Even in its
more modest assertion that it may be only
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within the domain of religion that fundamen-
talists do not think with as much complex-
ity, psychology has always focused on how
they choose to express themselves, not nec-
essarily on the thought that lay behind the
formulation of that expression.
In his article entitled "The End of the
Modern World,'* Diogenes Alien 5 * hails the
postmodern epistemological position to
which our culture has drifted as an opportu-
nity to "recover the full wealth of convic-
tion." Arguing that the ideas upon which
the modernist world-view was founded seem
to have crumbled, he seizes upon the posi-
tive dimension of our current situation, cast-
ing it as one in which Christianity can be
seen as fully relevant once again, intellectu-
ally and in every other respect. What others
have deplored as a relativizing trend, he
greets as an emancipating force liberating
religious belief from the intellectual subju-
gation it has suffered at the hands of mod-
ernism. The shift, chronicled here, in
psychology's perspective, from seeing fun-
damentalism as a cognitively challenged
movement to one simply subscribing to a
particular cultural style of mental process-
ing (and perhaps only of expression) is a sig-
nificant step in this postmodern direction.
While psychology still adheres, with
good reason, to its culturally enshrined as-
sumptions, it is at least beginning to recog-
nize them as such—to see, for example, that
more complex cognitive structure is better,
and logical consistency is superior, only in
relation to certain objectives that have been
culturally identified as valuable. Many may
be prepared to make these value judgments,
seeing them not only as culturally validated
but also, according to our best judgments, as
somehow more attuned to "reality" as it has
presented itself. Indeed, scholars must enter
the fray and stake their claim somewhere.
The difference is that now. with the aura of
absolute Truth dispelled from modernist as-
sumptions, modernism's claims can be rec-
ognized for what they are: value judgments
that hold their place and their power with re-
spect to a particular point of view that, while
it may be provisional, most people have iden-
tified as best. In a sense, then. Harold Bloom
was right to ask how one could argue against
a group so defiantly proud of its ignorance.
But the belittling tone of such remarks is part
of a judgment issuing from a deeply contex-
tualized alternative value system, one that
leads to exasperation with this group because
it vigorously promotes a different set of rules.
Thus, while it may not be possible to resolve
these cultural differences and their authori-
tative antinomies and methodological incom-
patibilities, at least they have been recognized
as such—an important accomplishment in its
own right.
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